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Framing as Path Dependence 
Natalie Gold and Christian List1 
Forthcoming in Economics and Philosophy 
Revised on 30 March 2004 
 
Abstract. A framing effect occurs when an agent’s choices are not invariant under changes in the way a 
decision problem is presented, e.g. changes in the way options are described (violation of description 
invariance) or preferences are elicited (violation of procedure invariance). Here we identify those 
rationality violations that underlie framing effects. Applying a model by List (2004), we attribute to the 
agent a sequential decision process in which a “target” proposition and several “background” 
propositions are considered. We suggest that the agent exhibits a framing effect if and only if two 
conditions are met. First, different presentations of the decision problem lead the agent to consider the 
propositions in a different order (the empirical condition). Second, different such “decision paths” lead 
to different decisions on the target proposition (the logical condition). The second condition holds when 
the agent's initial dispositions on the propositions are “implicitly inconsistent”, which may be caused by 
violations of “deductive closure”. Our account is consistent with some observations made by 
psychologists and provides a unified framework for explaining violations of description and procedure 
invariance.   
 
Keywords.  Framing, preference reversal, path dependence, rationality, deductive closure 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The decisions that people make are sometimes sensitive to the way in which the decision 
problem is presented. They may depend on the way in which the options are described or on 
the way in which people’s preferences are elicited. They are not always description invariant 
or procedure invariant. In a logician’s language, two decision problems may be extensionally 
equivalent and yet lead to different decisions. If we take a descriptive expression from a 
proposition and substitute a different expression that designates the same object this should, 
ideally, not affect the truth-value an agent assigns to the proposition. And yet, empirically, it 
sometimes does. These phenomena are called framing effects. Likewise, if we elicit an 
agent’s preferences over some options in two different ways this should, ideally, not affect 
the order in which the agent ranks the options. Yet again, empirically, it sometimes does. As 
we argue here, these phenomena can also be seen as framing effects. Psychologists have 
offered accounts of decision making to explain why violations of description invariance or 
procedure invariance occur, but framing effects are offensive to a logician's account of 
rationality. In this paper we use a logician's framework to examine exactly which classical 
conditions of rationality it is whose violation may lead to framing effects. Drawing on an 
earlier model by List (2004), we attribute to the agent a sequential decision process in which 
the agent considers a target proposition and several background propositions. We suggest 
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that the agent exhibits a framing effect if and only if two conditions are met, one logical and 
one empirical. The logical condition states that the agent’s decision on the target proposition 
is path dependent, i.e. it varies with the order in which the propositions are considered. This 
condition is satisfied if and only if the agent's initial dispositions on the propositions are 
implicitly inconsistent – which may be caused by violations of deductive closure – in a sense 
defined below. The empirical condition states that different presentations of the decision 
problem lead the agent to consider the propositions in different such orders. We suggest that 
different ways of framing a decision problem may indeed have this effect. This theoretical 
explanation is consistent with some observations made by psychologists and provides a 
unified framework within which we can see similarities between violations of description and 
procedure invariance.    
 
2. VIOLATIONS OF DESCRIPTION INVARIANCE 
 
An early experimental demonstration of framing effects, where the description of the options 
affected the choices that subjects made, is given by Tversky and Kahneman (1981). They 
asked subjects to imagine that the US was threatened by a disease that was expected to kill 
600 people, and that they had to make a choice between two alternative vaccination 
programs. Two groups were presented with the same decision problem but in different forms. 
The first group were told: 
 
 If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be 
saved, and 2/3 probability that no-one will be saved.  
 
The second group were told: 
 
 If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. 
If Program D is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that no-one will die, and 2/3  
probability that 600 people will die. 
 
Note that A and C are extensionally equivalent. They denote the same vaccination program, 
where precisely 200 people will be saved and 400 will die. Likewise, B and D are 
extensionally equivalent. They denote the same vaccination program, where there is a 1/3 
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probability that 600 people will be saved and no-one will die and a 2/3 probability that no-
one will be saved and 600 people will die. However, in the first group, 72% of subjects opted 
for Program A but, in the second group, 78% of subjects chose Program D. Changing the 
description of the options from one in terms of “lives saved” to one in terms of “lives lost” 
changed the modal preference. 
 
In response to this and other findings in the field of decision making under uncertainty, 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) developed prospect theory to explain the pattern of people's 
choices. Prospect theory suggests that decision makers code outcomes as gains or losses 
relative to some reference point and then, in their evaluation of the outcomes, are risk averse 
over gains but risk loving over losses. The way a decision problem is framed determines the 
reference point. In the above example, the phrasing “saved” in the first formulation of the 
problem highlights a gain so respondents are risk averse and the phrasing “die” in the second 
highlights a loss so they are risk loving. But although the original examples of framing 
involved risk, this is actually an unnecessary complicating factor. There is other evidence that 
changes in modal preference can be brought about in decisions that do not involve any 
uncertainty, simply by manipulating subjects' reference points and therefore what they regard 
as a gain or a loss. These results can then be explained by the theory of loss aversion, namely 
that individuals regard gains and losses differently (Tversky and Kahneman 1991). In fact 
there are even more general framing effects, not involving gains or losses. For instance, when 
asked to judge the quality of beef, subjects' evaluations depend on whether it is described as 
“75% lean” or “25% fat”. These framing effects might all be described as valence framing 
effects. Regardless of the presence of risk or reference points, in each case the different 
frames cast the same information in either a positive or a negative light. This leads to the 
suggestion that it is the positive or negative encoding of information that affects choice 
(Levin et al. 1998).2 
 
3. VIOLATIONS OF PROCEDURE INVARIANCE 
 
Framing effects are often identified with violations of description invariance, the 
phenomenon that choices are not invariant under changes in the way in which the options are 
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described. But there are also well-documented violations of procedure invariance, where 
choices are affected by the way in which preferences over the options are elicited. By 
changing the method of preference elicitation, the same agent can be induced to make 
inconsistent choices. We suggest that a violation of the same rationality conditions is 
responsible for both violations of description invariance and violations of procedure 
invariance. For this reason, we prefer to call both phenomena framing effects. 
 
One example of a violation of procedure invariance is a preference reversal phenomenon 
originally reported by Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971). Subjects were asked to evaluate pairs 
of gambles of comparable expected value. One gamble, the P gamble, offers a high 
probability of winning a relatively small amount of money. The other gamble, the $ gamble, 
offers a low probability of winning a larger prize. For instance, one of the pairs was: 
 
  P gamble    $ gamble 
 Win $2 with probability .80  Win $9.00 with probability .20  
 Lose $1 with probability .20  Lose $0.50 with probability .80 
  
Both gambles have an expected value of $1.40. Subjects were asked which gamble they 
preferred to play (a qualitative choice task) and also, in a different stage of the experiment, 
what price they would sell the right to play each gamble for (a quantitative valuation task). 
As Lichtenstein and Slovic said, “We say that option A is preferred to option B if option A is 
selected when B is available or if A has a higher reservation price than B. The standard 
analysis of choice assumes that these procedures give rise to the same ordering. This 
requirement – called procedure invariance – seldom appears as an explicit axiom but it is 
needed to ensure that the preference relation is well defined.” (Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971, 
p. 203) However, the pattern of choices was that subjects preferred to play the P gamble but 
gave the $ gamble a higher selling price. When the experimenters conducted a further study 
in a casino they found that, for gambles such as the above, of participants who chose the P 
gamble over the $ gamble, 81% specified a higher price for the $ gamble than for the P 
gamble and, what is more, some turned into "money pumps" continuously giving more 
money to the experimenters to switch between the gambles without ever playing them 
(Lichtenstein and Slovic 1973).3  
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Again, although the original examples of violations of procedure invariance concern 
preference reversals over gambles, this effect does not rely on the presence of risk. The effect 
occurs in a whole class of tasks where there are two options, each of which is assessed in 
terms of more than one attribute, and where there are two different modes of preference 
elicitation, for instance choice versus valuation. In the example of gambles, the attributes 
might be the maximal payoff and the probability of winning that maximal payoff. An 
example of violations of procedure invariance not involving uncertainty is given by the 
comparison of choice and matching, the latter being a type of valuation task. There are two 
options, with two relevant attributes each. In the matching task, for one of the options 
subjects are given the value of both attributes, whereas for the other they are given the value 
of only one. They are then asked to supply the value of the second attribute that would make 
the two options equal in overall value. For instance, subjects are asked to consider two 
candidates for an engineering job, X and Y, who are each assessed on two different 
attributes, technical knowledge and human relations. The matching task might consist of 
giving the subjects candidate X’s scores for both technical knowledge and human relations 
but only one of candidate Y’s scores, e.g. on technical knowledge, and asking what score on 
the other attribute, human relations, would make the two candidates equally suitable for the 
job. (In fact, there are four possible matching tasks depending on which of the four items of 
information is withheld.) From subjects’ responses in the matching task we should be able to 
predict the decisions subjects would make in the choice task, where they are given the values 
of all attributes, i.e. both X and Y’s scores for both technical knowledge and human relations. 
However, in an experiment, in the choice task 65% of subjects chose the candidate who 
scored higher on the more prominent attribute, technical knowledge, whereas the inference 
from the responses to the matching task was that only 34% would have rated this candidate as 
better. This leads to the prominence hypothesis that the prominent attribute will weigh more 
heavily in choice than in matching (Tversky at al. 1988). 
 
Psychologists have suggested two rival hypotheses to explain how elicitation procedures 
affect preferences: the strategy compatibility hypothesis and the scale compatibility 
hypothesis (Fischer and Hawkins 1993). On the strategy compatibility hypothesis, different 
modes of preference elicitation induce different heuristics. Specifically, choice tasks are held 
to induce lexicographic reasoning, i.e. a focus on a prominent attribute that is considered 
lexicographically prior to other attributes. Valuation tasks, in contrast, are held to induce 
explicit trade-offs between different attributes. According to this hypothesis, in the above 
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example, when subjects are asked to choose their preferred gamble the probability of winning 
is the prominent attribute. When asked for their monetary valuations of the gambles, they 
trade off the probability of winning against the maximal payoff and prefer the $ gamble. On 
the scale compatibility hypothesis, choices involving multiple attributes of the options are 
always made using the same heuristic, but different modes of preference elicitation change 
the weights assigned to these attributes. According to this hypothesis, in the above example, 
when subjects are asked to choose their preferred gamble the probability of winning is the 
attribute with the greater weight. When they are asked for their monetary valuations of the 
gambles the maximal payoff is the attribute with the greater weight.  
 
4. A SIMPLE MODEL OF DECISION MAKING 
 
We seek to explain framing effects by attributing to the agent a sequential decision process in 
which the agent considers multiple propositions. For this purpose, we apply a model of 
sequential decisions over multiple propositions developed by List (2004). Our application 
differs from the original model in two key respects. First, we represent propositions in 
predicate logic, whereas List (2004) represents propositions in propositional logic. The 
extension to predicate logic allows us to represent preferences over options, relations 
between options and other considerations in a single unified framework. Second, we focus on 
decisions made by an individual agent, whereas List’s (2004) main emphasis is on collective 
decisions. 
 
The key idea 
 
We represent an agent’s binary choice between x and y as the agent’s assignment of a truth-
value to a ranking proposition of the form “x is strictly preferred to y”, formally xPy. This 
ranking proposition is the target proposition, on which the agent has to make a decision. But 
we assume that the agent considers not only the target proposition, but also certain 
background propositions, which represent the “run-up” or “context” to the agent’s decision 
on the target proposition. They may include factual propositions, on which the agent may 
have beliefs that are relevant to her decision on the target proposition, and normative 
propositions whose resolution (i.e. acceptance or non-acceptance) may entail a particular 
stance on the target proposition. In short, among the background propositions are all those 
propositions that the agent may consider in the process leading up to her decision on the 
target proposition. 
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The language of predicate logic 
 
We first introduce the language of predicate logic in which the propositions are formalized. 
(For a precise definition of first-order predicate logic, see Hamilton 1988.) The language 
includes:  
• atomic propositions with zero-place predicates, e.g. P, Q, R, …; 
• atomic propositions with one-place predicates, e.g. Aa (“a has property A”); 
• atomic propositions with two-place predicates, e.g. aEb (“a stands in relation E to b”), 
aPb (“a is strictly preferred to b”); 
• compound propositions with logical connectives or quantifiers, e.g. ¬P, (P∧Q), 
∀x(Ax→Bx), ∀x∀y((Ax∧¬Ay)→xPy). 
Propositions take the truth-values “true” or “false”. Truth-value assignments satisfy the 
standard properties defined in classical first-order predicate logic (again see Hamilton 1988). 
A set of propositions, S, is logically consistent if there exists at least one truth-value 
assignment under which all propositions in S are true. A set of propositions S logically entails 
a proposition φ, if, for all truth-value assignments, [if all propositions in S are true, then so is 
φ]. 
 
The propositions considered by the agent 
 
We assume that the agent considers a (finite non-empty) set of propositions, denoted X, from 
the language just introduced, where X contains both the target proposition and the relevant 
background propositions.4 If agents were asked for their reasons for making a certain choice, 
they might refer to those normative and factual propositions they would assent to in the run-
up to making the choice. So our notion of background propositions considered by the agent 
parallels the notion of reasons for choice discussed in philosophy and psychology. 
 
The agent’s initial dispositions 
 
How do we represent the agent’s attitudes towards the propositions in X? We assume that, for 
each proposition φ in X, the agent has an initial disposition on that proposition. Her initial 
disposition on φ is the judgement (acceptance/non-acceptance) she would make on φ if she 
were to consider φ in isolation, with no reference to other propositions. Note that an initial 
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disposition is a counterfactual notion. Saying that an agent has an initial disposition on φ 
does not carry any implications as to whether she has in fact considered the proposition. The 
agent’s initial dispositions are represented by an acceptance function δ assigning a value of 0 
or 1 to each proposition φ in X, where δ(φ) = 1 means that the agent has an initial disposition 
to accept φ, and δ(φ) = 0 means that the agent has an initial disposition not to accept φ.  
 
The decision path 
 
A decision path is the order in which the agent considers the propositions in a sequential 
decision process. Formally, a decision path is represented by a one-to-one function Ω from 
the numbers 1, 2, 3, …, l into the set X, where l is less than or equal to the number of 
propositions, k, in X.5 We interpret Ω(1), Ω(2), ..., Ω(l) as the first, second, ..., last 
propositions considered by the agent. Typically, the last proposition considered in the path, 
Ω(l), is the target proposition, while the preceding propositions, Ω(1), Ω(2), ..., Ω(l-1) are the 
background propositions. But our model also allows that sometimes the target proposition 
may occur earlier in the path. A decision path Ω is exhaustive if it reaches all propositions in 
X (i.e. l=k), and non-exhaustive if it reaches some but not all propositions in X (i.e. l<k). A 
decision path can be interpreted in more than one way: as the temporal order in which the 
agent considers the propositions, as the order of how focal the propositions are for the agent, 
or how much weight the agent assigns to the propositions.  
 
The criteria for the acceptance or non-acceptance of propositions in a sequential decision 
process 
 
Suppose that the agent considers the propositions one-by-one along a given decision path. 
When does she accept a proposition and when not? Suppose that proposition φ is under 
consideration. By assumption, the agent has an initial disposition on φ. There are two 
possibilities: either this initial disposition is logically consistent (and perceived so by the 
agent) with the agent’s previously accepted propositions, or it is not. If it is, the agent can 
make a decision (acceptance/non-acceptance) on the new proposition according to her initial 
disposition. If it is not, the agent requires a method for resolving the logical conflict. Under 
the modus ponens rule, used below, the agent resolves this conflict by accepting the logical 
implications of previously accepted propositions and overruling her initial disposition on the 
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new proposition.6 Attributing the modus ponens rule to an agent is useful for explaining 
framing effects, as that rule captures the notion that the run-up to the agent’s decision on a 
proposition may constrain that decision. We suggest that different decision frames induce 
different run-ups to an agent’s decision on the target proposition.  
 
A modus ponens decision process 
 
We can now define a modus ponens decision process, following List (2004): 
• Consider the propositions along a given decision path Ω: proposition φ1 := Ω(1) in step 1, 
proposition φ2 := Ω(2) in step 2, …, proposition φl := Ω(l) in step l. 
• For each step t = 1, 2, …, l, let Φt be the set of all propositions accepted in steps 1, 2, …, 
t. Define Φt inductively as follows (adding step 0): 
t = 0: Φ0 is the empty set. 
t > 0: Proposition φt is considered. There are two cases: 
               Case I: The set of previously accepted propositions Φt-1 entails φt or it entails ¬φt.  
 
 Φt-1 ∪ {φt} if Φt-1 entails φt   
    Then Φt := {  
     Φt-1 ∪ {¬φt} if Φt-1 entails ¬φt.  
 
Case II: The set of previously accepted propositions Φt-1 entails neither φt nor ¬φt.  
   
  Φt-1 ∪ {φt} if δ(φt) = 1  
     Then Φt := {  
      Φt-1   if δ(φt) = 0. 
For a given acceptance function δ and a given decision path Ω, a modus ponens decision 
process produces an outcome set, defined as M(δ, Ω) := Φl.7 In our subsequent examples, the 
decision process ends when the agent decides on the target proposition, but nothing hinges on 
the decision path being non-exhaustive. 
 
5. RATIONALITY CONDITIONS AND THEIR VIOLATION 
 
We first state four rationality conditions which an agent’s initial dispositions may or may not 
satisfy and then consider possible violations of these conditions.  
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 Other methods are conceivable. Under the modus tollens rule, for example, the agent resolves the 
conflict by accepting her initial disposition on the new proposition and revising previously accepted 
propositions.  
7
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of ¬φt  at a different step from φt in the decision path. If δ is incomplete (defined below), this definition 
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Rationality conditions 
 
Suppose the agent’s initial dispositions are represented by the acceptance function δ
 
. 
 
Completeness. For all propositions φ in X, the agent has a disposition to accept either φ or its 
negation, i.e. δ(φ)=1 or δ(¬φ)=1. 
 
Weak Consistency. For all propositions φ in X, the agent does not have a disposition to 
accept both φ and its negation, i.e. not both δ(φ)=1 and δ(¬φ)=1. 
 
Strong Consistency. The propositions in X that the agent has a disposition to accept can all 
be simultaneously true, i.e. the set {φ∈X : δ(φ)=1} is logically consistent. 
 
Deductive Closure. For any logically consistent set of propositions Ψ and any proposition φ, 
if the agent has dispositions to accept all propositions in Ψ and Ψ entails φ, then the agent 
also has a disposition to accept φ, i.e. if [δ(ψ)=1 for all ψ in Ψ] and Ψ entails φ, then δ(φ)=1.  
 
The conditions are logically interdependent. Strong consistency implies weak consistency. 
The conjunction of weak consistency and deductive closure implies strong consistency.  
 
Rationality violations 
 
Three types of rationality violations are particularly important for our analysis: 
 
Deductive closure violations. An agent's initial dispositions violate deductive closure with 
respect to a proposition φ in X if there exists a logically consistent set of propositions Ψ such 
that the agent has dispositions to accept all propositions in Ψ, Ψ entails φ, and yet the agent 
has no disposition to accept φ, i.e. [δ(ψ)=1 for all ψ in Ψ] and Ψ  entails φ and δ(φ)=0. 
 
Explicit inconsistencies. An agent's initial dispositions are explicitly inconsistent with 
respect to a proposition φ in X if the agent has dispositions to accept both φ and ¬φ, i.e. 
δ(φ)=1 and δ(¬φ)=1. (So explicit inconsistencies are violations of weak consistency.) 
 
Implicit inconsistencies. An agent's initial dispositions are implicitly inconsistent with 
respect to a proposition φ in X if there exist two logically consistent sets of propositions Ψ1 
and Ψ2 such that the agent has dispositions to accept all propositions in Ψ1 and all 
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propositions in Ψ2 (i.e. δ(ψ)=1 for all ψ in Ψ1∪Ψ2), but Ψ1 entails φ and Ψ2 entails ¬φ. (By 
lemma A1 in the appendix, implicit inconsistencies are violations of strong consistency.) 
 
Implicit inconsistencies can occur in two different ways. First, they occur when the agent’s 
initial dispositions are explicitly inconsistent, so the agent accepts both a proposition and its 
negation. Second, they occur when some propositions that the agent has a disposition to 
accept entail the negation of what is entailed by other propositions that the agent has a 
disposition to accept, although the agent does not have a disposition to accept those 
implications themselves. To clarify this with an example, imagine an agent with initial 
dispositions to accept P, (P→Q), ¬Q, and no other propositions. These initial dispositions 
are implicitly inconsistent (they violate strong consistency): the set of propositions accepted 
by the agent has two logically consistent subsets, Ψ1 = {P, (P→Q)} and Ψ2 = {¬Q}, such 
that Ψ1 entails Q and Ψ2 entails ¬Q. But the agent's initial dispositions are not explicitly 
inconsistent (they satisfy weak consistency): she does not have a disposition to accept a 
proposition and its negation simultaneously. In a slight abuse of language, all explicit 
inconsistencies are also implicit inconsistencies, but not all implicit inconsistencies are also 
explicit inconsistencies. Note that, if weak consistency is satisfied, deductive closure 
violations may cause implicit inconsistencies.  
 
Lemma 1. (List 2004) Suppose that the agent's initial dispositions over the propositions 
(represented by δ) are complete and weakly consistent. Then, for any φ in X, the agent's 
initial dispositions are implicitly inconsistent with respect to φ if and only if the agent's initial 
dispositions are not deductively closed with respect to one of φ or ¬φ.8 
 
6. LOGICAL AND EMPIRICAL CONDITIONS FOR A FRAMING EFFECT 
 
We first introduce the concept of path dependence in a modus ponens decision process and 
state necessary and sufficient conditions for path dependence. We then identify logical and 
empirical conditions for a framing effect. 
 
Path dependence 
 
A modus ponens decision process is path dependent with respect to some proposition φ in X 
if there exist at least two decision paths with mutually inconsistent outcomes on φ, i.e. there 
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exist two paths Ω1 and Ω2 such that, under Ω1, φ is accepted (i.e. φ is in M(δ, Ω1)) and, under 
Ω2, ¬φ is accepted (i.e. ¬φ is in M(δ, Ω2)).9 Note the following necessary and sufficient 
condition for path dependence.  
 
Theorem 1. (List 2004) For any proposition φ in X, a modus ponens decision process is path 
dependent with respect to φ if and only if the agent's initial dispositions (represented by δ) are 
implicitly inconsistent with respect to φ.10 
 
The conjunction of theorem 1 and lemma 1 yields a necessary and sufficient condition for 
path dependence in the case where the agent’s initial dispositions are complete and weakly 
consistent. 
 
Theorem 2. (List 2004) Suppose that the agent’s initial dispositions over the propositions 
(represented by δ) are complete and weakly consistent. A modus ponens decision process is 
path dependent with respect to φ if and only if the agent's initial dispositions (represented by 
δ) violate deductive closure with respect to one of φ or ¬φ.11 
 
Framing 
 
An agent exhibits a framing effect if two different presentations of a decision problem lead 
her to make two different decisions on the target proposition. In our model, the agent makes 
decisions using a modus ponens decision process, based on an acceptance function δ 
representing her initial dispositions. We suggest that each presentation of a decision problem 
leads the agent to focus on the background propositions in a particular order, thus inducing a 
corresponding decision path. In particular, different presentations may induce different 
decision paths. In terms of our model, an agent therefore exhibits a framing effect if and only 
if two conditions are met, one logical and one empirical:  
 
                                                          
9
 The present use of path dependence follows that in List (2004), where it is also compared with the 
standard social-choice-theoretic use of that concept (e.g. Plott 1973). Typically, path dependence refers 
to the phenomenon that, in pairwise choices over multiple alternatives, the winning alternative may 
differ depending on the order in which the choices are made. However, if we identify pairwise choices 
with pairwise ranking propositions, the standard concept of path dependence can be shown to be a 
special case of the concept as used here. The relation between preferences and propositions is discussed 
in List and Pettit (2004). 
10
 A proof is stated in the appendix. 
11
 A proof is stated in the appendix. 
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The logical condition. There exist two decision paths such that, under one, the agent accepts 
the target proposition and, under the other, she accepts its negation (or some set of 
propositions which entail that negation).12 
 
The empirical condition. There exist two ways of presenting the decision problem to the 
agent that, empirically, lead the agent to use these two decision paths.13 
 
Note that the logical condition alone is insufficient for a framing effect: there may exist two 
logically possible decision paths generating different decisions on the target proposition in a 
modus ponens decision process, and yet there may not exist two corresponding presentations 
of the decision problem that empirically lead the agent to use these paths. (This is related to 
the more general point, discussed below, that not all logically possible decision paths are 
empirically feasible.) Theorem 1 leads to the following result:  
 
Result 1. The logical condition for a framing effect is satisfied if and only if the agent's 
initial dispositions are implicitly inconsistent with respect to the target proposition. 
 
Further, theorem 2 leads to the following result: 
 
Result 2. If the agent’s initial dispositions are complete and weakly consistent, the logical 
condition for a framing effect is satisfied if and only if the agent's initial dispositions violate 
deductive closure with respect to the target proposition or its negation. 
 
While an implicit inconsistency with respect to the target proposition (or a deductive closure 
violation with respect to the target proposition or its negation) is necessary and sufficient for 
the logical condition of a framing effect, it is only necessary, but not sufficient, for the actual 
occurrence of a framing effect, as the empirical condition must also be met.  
 
When is the empirical condition met? More research is needed on this question. However, 
from a theoretical point of view, we can distinguish between two classes of decision paths: 
(1) decision paths that are empirically feasible (i.e. that an agent would use under certain 
empirical conditions), and (2) decision paths that are not empirically feasible (i.e. that an 
                                                          
12
 This is a logical condition once the set of propositions X, the acceptance function δ and the use of a 
modus ponens decision process are given. Of course, it remains an empirical matter what the set of 
propositions X is, what the agent’s acceptance function is, and whether the agent uses a modus ponens 
decision process. 
13
 This is an empirical condition as it depends on empirical facts about the agent’s psychology and 
particularly her responsiveness to external stimuli. 
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agent would not use under any empirical conditions). Within class (1), there might be a 
secondary distinction between (1a) decision paths that can be induced externally by some 
presentation of the decision problem, and (1b) decision paths that cannot be induced 
externally in this manner. An important question for further research on presentations and 
decision paths is whether or not class (1b) is empty. For the empirical condition to be met in 
addition to the logical condition, the two logically possible decision paths leading to opposite 
decisions on the target proposition must both fall into class (1a).14  
 
What decision paths are empirically infeasible and thus fall into class (2)? One might think 
that class (2) includes decision paths in which some factual propositions come after some 
normative ones and the modus ponens rule leads the agent to overrule her views on these 
factual propositions in light of some of the normative propositions accepted earlier. However, 
it is an empirical question whether people will sometimes revise their factual beliefs on the 
basis of their normative beliefs, and we cannot rule out a priori that they might sometimes do 
this. Clearly, the question of how large or small class (1) (particularly class (1a)) is compared 
to class (2) has important implications for the question of how empirically prevalent the 
phenomena represented by our model are. 
 
But when the empirical condition is met, our model suggests that framing effects are caused 
by certain implicit inconsistencies or deductive closure violations in the agent’s initial 
dispositions. 
 
7. VIOLATIONS OF DESCRIPTION INVARIANCE AS PATH DEPENDENCE 
 
We can use the framework above to illuminate violations of description invariance. Take the 
disease problem of Kahneman and Tversky. Recall that they asked their subjects to choose 
between two alternative vaccination programs. For one group of subjects, the two programs 
were presented in terms of “lives saved” and labelled A and B. For another group, they were 
presented in terms of “lives lost” and labelled C and D. As noted above, A and C are 
extensionally equivalent, denoting the same vaccination program. Let us call this program 
pAC. Likewise, B and D are extensionally equivalent, denoting the same vaccination program. 
Let us call this program pBD. We define three predicates: 
 
                                                          
14
 Actually, to be precise, it might not be strictly necessary for a framing effect that both of the two 
paths fall into class (1a). It might sometimes be sufficient if one of them, say Ω1, falls into class (1a), 
whereas the other, say Ω2, falls into class (1b). This might be the case if Ω2 is a “default” path that the 
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Qx :  x saves some lives with certainty (and does not involve a risk that no-one will be 
saved). 
Rx :  x consigns some people to death with certainty (and does not involve the chance that 
no-one will die). 
xPy :  x is strictly preferred to y. 
 
We assume that, as a minimal condition of rationality, the agent accepts ∀x∀y(xPy→¬yPx). 
We further assume that the agent has initial dispositions to accept the following (factual) 
propositions (which are true of the programs): 
 
(1) Program A/C saves some lives (200) with certainty, i.e. QpAC. 
(2) Program B/D involves the risk that no-one will be saved (with probability 2/3 no-one will 
be saved), i.e. ¬QpBD. 
(3) Program A/C consigns some people to death (400) with certainty, i.e. RpAC. 
(4) Program B/D offers the chance that no-one will die (with probability 1/3 no-one will die), 
i.e. ¬RpBD. 
 
We also assume that the agent has initial dispositions to accept the following two (normative) 
propositions: 
(5) It is not worth taking the risk that no-one will be saved. Formally, if program y involves 
the risk that no-one will be saved, whereas program x saves some lives with certainty, 
then x is preferable to y, i.e. ∀x∀y((Qx∧¬Qy)→xPy). 
(6) It is unacceptable to consign some people to death with certainty. Formally, if program x 
consigns some people to death with certainty, whereas program y offers the chance that 
no-one will die, then y is preferable to x, i.e. ∀x∀y((Rx∧¬Ry)→yPx). 
 
Under our assumptions, the agent’s initial dispositions are incomplete (though this is not a 
crucial requirement, as discussed below). The agent has initial dispositions to accept some 
factual propositions, such as (1) to (4), and some normative propositions, such as (5) and (6). 
But she does not have initial dispositions to accept the ranking propositions pACPpBD or 
pBDPpAC, as she is unable to accept either of these in isolation, without considering relevant 
factual and normative background propositions such as (1) to (6).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
agent uses for internal reasons (unless externally prompted to use a different path), while Ω1 is a path 
that the agent can be externally induced to use by a suitable presentation of the decision problem. 
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It is easy to see that the agent’s initial dispositions are implicitly, but not explicitly, 
inconsistent with respect to the ranking proposition pACPpBD. Let Ψ1 = {QpAC, ¬QpBD, 
∀x∀y((Qx∧¬Qy)→xPy)} and Ψ2 = {RpAC, ¬RpBD, ∀x∀y((Rx∧¬Ry)→yPx)}. Then the agent 
has initial dispositions to accept the propositions in each of Ψ1 and Ψ2, where Ψ1 entails 
pACPpBD, and Ψ2 entails pBDPpAC (which implies ¬pACPpBD). But there is no proposition such 
that the agent has a disposition to accept both the proposition and its negation. The agent’s 
initial dispositions also violate deductive closure, as pACPpBD is entailed by Ψ1 and yet the 
agent has no disposition to accept pACPpBD itself.  
 
We argue that these properties of the agent’s initial dispositions can be used to explain the 
framing phenomenon identified by Kahneman and Tversky. In the decision problem given to 
Kahneman and Tversky’s subjects, the target proposition is the ranking proposition pACPpBD 
(or its opposite pBDPpAC). As we have just seen, the agent’s initial dispositions are implicitly 
inconsistent with respect to that proposition, so (by result 1) the agent satisfies the logical 
condition for a framing effect. Does she also satisfy the empirical condition? 
 
We suggest that the two different presentations of the decision problem, in terms of “lives 
saved” and “lives lost”, induce two different decision paths. The presentation in terms of 
“lives saved” may induce a decision path starting with factual and normative propositions 
about saving lives, i.e. propositions (1), (2) and (5). When the agent is prompted to think 
about “lives saved”, she may consider these propositions first, they may become more focal, 
or they may receive more weight.  
 
Path 1: QpAC in step 1, ¬QpBD in step 2, ∀x∀y((Qx∧¬Qy)→xPy) in step 3, pACPpBD in step 4. 
 
For parallel reasons, the presentation in terms of “lives lost” may induce a decision path 
starting with factual and normative propositions about losing lives, i.e. propositions (3), (4) 
and (6).  
 
Path 2: RpAC in step 1, ¬RpBD in step 2, ∀x∀y((Rx∧¬Ry)→yPx) in step 3, pBDPpAC in step 4. 
 
The outcome set of a modus ponens decision process under path 1 is {QpAC, ¬QpBD, 
∀x∀y((Qx∧¬Qy)→xPy), pACPpBD}. The outcome set under path 2 is {RpAC, ¬RpBD, 
∀x∀y((Rx∧¬Ry)→yPx), pBDPpAC}. In step 4, under each path, the agent accepts a ranking 
proposition: pACPpBD under path 1 and pBDPpAC under path 2. This enables the agent to make 
a choice over the alternative programs, i.e. A/C is chosen under path 1, and B/D is chosen 
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under path 2. The outcomes of the two paths are mutually inconsistent, as the propositions 
pACPpBD and pBDPpAC cannot both be accepted under the minimal rationality condition 
introduced above.15 (Note that both decision paths are non-exhaustive in that they reach some 
but not all relevant propositions and stop once the target proposition is reached.) 
 
This result is not dependent on the fact that the agent’s initial dispositions are incomplete 
(although incompleteness would seem to be a realistic assumption here). This can be 
illustrated by making the agent’s initial dispositions complete, for instance by assuming that 
(in addition to the initial dispositions specified above) the agent has initial dispositions to 
accept pACPpBD and ¬pBDPpAC. Such an assumption might be motivated by the supposition 
that the agent has already considered the decision problem under the first presentation. The 
modified initial dispositions still satisfy weak consistency but (by lemma 1) are implicitly 
inconsistent because they violate deductive closure with respect to the ranking proposition 
pBDPpAC. So now (by result 2) the agent satisfies the logical condition for a framing effect. 
The agent might then satisfy the empirical condition for similar reasons as above.  
 
8. VIOLATIONS OF PROCEDURE INVARIANCE AS PATH DEPENDENCE 
 
We now suggest that violations of procedure invariance can also be understood as path 
dependence. Take the preference reversal phenomenon identified by Lichtenstein and Slovic. 
Let p and d denote the P gamble and the $ gamble, respectively. We define four predicates: 
 
xEy :  x has a higher expected payoff than y. 
xSy :  x has a higher probability of winning the maximal payoff than y. 
xTy :  x has a larger maximal payoff than y. 
xPy :  x is strictly preferred to y. 
  
As before, we assume that, as a minimal condition of rationality, the agent accepts 
∀x∀y(xPy→¬yPx). We further assume that the agent has initial dispositions to accept the 
following (factual) propositions (which are true of the gambles): 
                                                          
15
 In the original Kahneman and Tversky experiments, the two different presentations of the decision 
problem were given to two different groups of subjects, where the majority of one group preferred A to 
B, and the majority of the other D to C. Hence there was no opportunity for the same subject to reveal 
inconsistent preferences under the two alternative presentations, as the agent does in our model. 
However, Kahneman and Tversky’s claim is that “[i]ndividuals who face a decision problem and have a 
definite preference (i) might have a different preference in a different framing of the same problem, (ii) 
are normally unaware of alternative frames and of their potential effects on the relative attractiveness of 
options, (iii) would wish their preferences to be independent of frame, but (iv) are often uncertain how 
to resolve detected inconsistencies” (Tversky and Kahneman 1981, pp. 457-458). 
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(1) The $ gamble has a larger maximal payoff than the P gamble, i.e. dTp. 
(2) The P gamble has a higher probability of winning the maximal payoff than the $ gamble, 
i.e. pSd. 
(3) Neither gamble has a higher expected payoff than the other, i.e. (¬pEd∧¬dEp).16 
 
We also assume that the agent has initial dispositions to accept the following two (normative) 
propositions: 
 
(4) For two gambles with the same expected payoff, the one with the higher probability of 
winning the maximal payoff is preferable, i.e. ∀x∀y((¬xEy∧¬yEx)→(xSy→xPy)). 
(5) For two gambles with the same expected payoff, the one with the larger maximal payoff 
is preferable, i.e. ∀x∀y((¬xEy∧¬yEx)→(xTy→xPy)). 
 
As in the Kahneman and Tversky problem of the previous section, the agent’s initial 
dispositions are incomplete, as the agent does not have initial dispositions to accept the 
ranking propositions dPp or pPd, and they are implicitly, but not explicitly, inconsistent. If 
we let Ψ1 = {dTp, (¬pEd∧¬dEp), ∀x∀y((¬xEy∧¬yEx)→(xTy→xPy))} and Ψ2 = {pSd, 
(¬pEd∧¬dEp), ∀x∀y((¬xEy∧¬yEx)→(xSy→xPy))}, then Ψ1 entails dPp, and Ψ2 entails pPd 
(which implies ¬dPp). The agent’s initial dispositions also violate deductive closure with 
respect to dPp and pPd.  
 
We argue that these properties of the agent’s initial dispositions lead to an explanation of the 
Lichtenstein and Slovic problem, analogous to our explanation of the Kahneman and Tversky 
problem. We take the target proposition to be the ranking proposition dPp. This requires 
some explanation. Recall that Lichtenstein and Slovic asked their subjects which gamble they 
preferred to play and, separately, what price they would sell each gamble for. So subjects had 
to do two different tasks, a choice task and a valuation task. The use of a single target 
proposition in our explanation – i.e. the ranking proposition dPp – rests on the theoretical 
stipulation that the same ranking proposition governs not only the choice of which gamble to 
                                                          
16
 In the following, we do not mean to imply that the agent actually calculates the expected payoff of the 
gambles and then disregards the result of the calculation when making her choice. Of course, when two 
gambles have the same expected payoff, then an expected payoff maximising agent might use another 
criterion as a tie breaker. But, although Lichtenstein and Slovic used pairs of gambles with comparative 
expected payoffs, not all the pairs consisted of gambles with exactly the same expected payoff. It is 
arguably psychologically more realistic that the agent would notice that the gambles have similar 
expected payoffs, without making precise calculations of them. The proposition that the gambles have 
the same expected payoff, (¬pEd∧¬dEp), is stronger than this. If anything, this suggests that the 
preference reversal phenomenon might occur in a wider class of cases than those suggested by the 
application of the model in this section. 
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play but also the valuation of the gambles.17 We suggest that using a single target proposition 
not only leads to a more parsimonious explanation of the Lichtenstein and Slovic problem 
than using two different ones (one for choice and one for valuation), but also highlights the 
analogy to the Kahneman and Tversky problem. As we have seen, the agent’s initial 
dispositions are implicitly inconsistent with respect to the target proposition dPp, so, again, 
(by result 1) the agent satisfies the logical condition for a framing effect. We now turn to the 
empirical condition. 
 
Again, we suggest that the two different presentations of the decision problem, in terms of 
“which gamble is preferable to play” and “what price to sell each gamble for”, induce two 
different decision paths. There is evidence that, when assessing gambles, choices between 
gambles are determined primarily by the gambles' probabilities, while valuations (both 
selling prices and buying prices) depend mainly on the payoffs (Slovic and Lichtenstein 
1968). In a study of preference reversals, Schkade and Johnson (1989) monitored the time 
spent by subjects looking at probabilities and payoffs and found that subjects who exhibited 
preference reversals spent more of their time looking at payoffs when pricing gambles than 
when choosing between them.18 In line with this evidence, we suggest that asking “which 
gamble is preferable to play” may induce a decision path starting with the factual and 
normative propositions about the probability of winning (together with noticing that the two 
gambles have a similar expected payoff), i.e. propositions  (2), (3) and (4).  
 
Path 1: (¬pEd∧¬dEp) in step 1, pSd in step 2, ∀x∀y((¬xEy∧¬yEx)→(xSy→xPy)) in step 3, 
pPd in step 4. 
 
For parallel reasons, asking “what price to sell each gamble for” may induce a decision path 
starting with the factual and normative propositions about the maximal payoff, i.e. 
propositions (1), (3) and (5). 
                                                          
17
 In fact, in Lichtenstein and Slovic’s experimental design, the choice task was comparative (the 
subject had to choose between the two gambles), whereas the valuation task was non-comparative (the 
subjects were asked not for a relative valuation of the two gambles, but for an absolute valuation of 
each gamble). Our theoretical explanation, however, represents both tasks as comparative, so we 
implicitly assume that relative and absolute valuation are ordinally equivalent. So, our theoretical 
representation rests on the hypothesis that the (preference) reversal phenomenon identified by 
Lichtenstein and Slovic is driven primarily by the choice/valuation distinction between the tasks, rather 
than the comparative/non-comparative distinction. In particular, our explanation suggests that a 
(preference) reversal phenomenon will occur even in two comparative tasks, where probability of 
winning is salient in one and monetary value in another. 
18
 This is consistent with psychological theory. Advocates of the strategy compatibility hypothesis 
specifically suggest that the probability of winning is the prominent attribute in choice. The strategy 
compatibility hypothesis and the scale compatibility hypothesis both suggest that the monetary 
component of the gambles is more important attribute in valuation. 
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Path 2: (¬pEd∧¬dEp) in step 1, dTp in step 2, ∀x∀y((¬xEy∧¬yEx)→(xTy→xPy)) in step 3, 
dPp in step 4. 
 
The outcome set of a modus ponens decision process under path 1 is {(¬pEd∧¬dEp), pSd, 
∀x∀y((¬xEy∧¬yEx)→(xSy→xPy)), pPd}. The outcome set under path 2 is {(¬pEd∧¬dEp), 
dTp, ∀x∀y((¬xEy∧¬yEx)→(xTy→xPy)), dPp}. In step 4, under each path, the agent accepts 
a ranking proposition: pPd under path 1 and dPp under path 2. If asked to choose which of 
the two gambles to play, i.e. under path 1, the agent would choose the P gamble over the $ 
gamble. If asked to specify a price for which to sell each gamble, i.e. under path 2, the agent 
would sell the $ gamble at a higher price than the P gamble. When represented in terms of the 
same target proposition – i.e. dPp – the two outcomes are mutually inconsistent, as the 
propositions pPd and dPp cannot both be accepted under the minimal rationality condition 
introduced above. (As before, both decision paths are non-exhaustive in that they reach some 
but not all relevant propositions and stop once the target proposition is reached.) 
 
Again, the result does not depend on the fact that the agent’s initial dispositions are 
incomplete. If we make the agent’s initial dispositions complete, for instance by assuming 
that the agent has the additional initial disposition to accept pPd (maybe as a result of a 
previous choice), the modified initial dispositions still violate deductive closure with respect 
to dPp and result 2 yields an explanation of the framing problem similar to the one given 
here. 
 
9. DISCUSSION 
 
An agent’s decisions are sometimes not invariant under changes in the way in which the 
decision problem is framed, be it the way in which the options are described or the way in 
which preferences are elicited. We have presented a model of decision making where an 
agent considers a number of background propositions in the run-up to making a decision on 
the target proposition, and we have suggested that framing effects may occur when the 
agent’s initial dispositions on the relevant propositions are implicitly inconsistent. Our 
approach highlights similarities between violations of description invariance and procedure 
invariance, in that it represents both as the result of different frames inducing different 
decision paths that lead to different decisions on the target proposition.  
 
One can identify two traditions in research on decision making: value-based and reason-
based (Shafir, Simonson and Tversky 1993). Value-based accounts typically specify a 
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numerical value function over alternative outcomes and represent choice as the maximisation 
of value. Reason-based accounts identify how reasons and arguments influence choice, 
generally without the use of formal models. Our model falls into the reason-based tradition, 
formalising some of the ideas underlying such accounts. Our notion of background 
propositions parallels the notion of reasons for choice discussed in philosophy and 
psychology. If agents were asked for their reasons for making a certain choice, they might 
select those propositions they would assent to in the run-up to making that choice. As with 
formal value-based models, we attribute to the agent a preference relation representing the 
agent’s choice. In our model, however, the preference relation is formalized not in terms of a 
utility function, but in terms of ranking propositions, where those ranking propositions are 
considered in a modus ponens decision process along with other background propositions. 
The decision process generates a set of accepted propositions. Choices are based on the 
ranking propositions accepted in that process.  
 
Unlike value-based accounts of choice our model does not represent choices explicitly in 
terms of numerical trade-offs. However, as mentioned above, violations of description or 
procedure invariance also occur in situations where there is no risk, so it might be considered 
as an asset of our account that it can explain a family of effects within a unified framework. 
Also, it appears that people wish to justify their decisions by saying that they chose for a 
(single) reason, even to the extent of constructing and selecting choice situations such that 
there is always a dominant reason for choice (Montgomery 1983). Under an interpretation 
where the ordering of the propositions given by the decision path represents the importance 
accorded to various considerations, our model has much in common with lexicographic 
proposals such as take the best (Gigerenzer et al. 2000) and elimination by aspects (Tversky 
1972), where options are explicitly compared on one dimension at a time. We have argued 
that people who exhibit framing effects endorse reasons that fail certain tests of consistency. 
Our model focuses on the formal properties of these reasons; it does not specify or restrict 
their content. We do not claim that people never think numerically or make trade-offs. An 
agent's reasons may include explicit calculations of risk and expected value. In a reason-
based approach such calculations can simply be seen as reasons for certain choices (Schafir, 
Simonson and Tversky 1993).  
 
Our model captures some features of decision making that psychologists have observed and 
that reason-based accounts seek to incorporate. The decision path leading up to the target 
proposition represents the context in which a choice is made. The path used depends on the 
formulation of the question, and it may end when the target proposition is reached, even 
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when other background propositions have not been considered. What matters for the 
decision, in our model, are the particular propositions (reasons) that occur in the decision 
path, but not other propositions outside that path even if these also seem relevant from the 
perspective of an external observer. This is akin to the notion of concrete thinking, whereby 
decision-makers use only surface information (Slovic 1972). Judgements are based only upon 
explicitly stated probabilities and payoffs. Underlying characteristics of the alternatives do 
not exert any significant influence, and information that is derivable from, but not explicitly 
included in, the presentation of the decision problem tends to be ignored (Fischhoff, Slovic 
and Lichtenstein 1978). Psychologists have noted a tendency for “considerations that are out 
of sight to be out of mind” (Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein 1988, p. 153).  
 
Kenneth Arrow said that making the same choices in extensionally equivalent decision 
problems is, “[a]n elemental effect of rationality, so elemental that we hardly notice it” 
(Arrow 1982, p. 6). Contrary to Arrow, we may hardly notice that our choices are not always 
the same in such decision problems. Although violations of description or procedure 
invariance are, on our account, caused by inconsistencies in an agent’s initial dispositions, 
implicit inconsistencies are sufficient, while explicit ones are not necessary. Explicit 
inconsistencies are of course special cases of implicit inconsistencies. The fact that some 
subjects do not change their choices even when the inconsistency is made explicit to them 
suggests that some people are willing to hold explicitly inconsistent beliefs (Ordonez et al. 
1995). But even an agent who checked her initial dispositions to rule out explicit 
inconsistencies might not be aware of implicit inconsistencies in these dispositions. More 
computationally demanding checking would be required to discover implicit inconsistencies, 
as the agent would have to compute all the logical implications of all the (sets of) 
propositions she has dispositions to accept. The logical condition for a framing effect is met 
if the agent has a disposition to accept a set of propositions (or reasons) that have normative 
force for her, but that have different implications for some target proposition and thus violate 
strong consistency (although they may be weakly consistent). It is certainly conceivable that 
the totality of reasons that have normative force for an agent may violate strong consistency 
in this manner. Now the empirical condition for a framing effect is met if different 
presentations of a decision problem make different reasons with different such implications 
salient. To the extent that these two conditions are satisfied, people will make different 
choices in extensionally equivalent choice situations. 
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APPENDIX 
 
The proofs in this appendix follow List (2004). 
 
Lemma A1. Recall that X contains neither tautologies nor contradictions. The following 
holds: (i) {φ∈X : δ(φ)=1} is logically inconsistent if and only if (ii) there exist two logically 
consistent subsets Ψ1,Ψ2⊆X and a proposition φ∈X such that [δ(ψ)=1 for all ψ∈Ψ1∪Ψ2] and 
Ψ1 entails φ and Ψ2 entails ¬φ. 
 
Proof of lemma A1. 
(i) implies (ii): Suppose that (i) holds. Let Ψ2 be a maximal logically consistent subset of 
{φ∈X : δ(φ)=1}. First, Ψ2 is non-empty, since X is non-empty and contains no contradictions. 
Second, Ψ2 is a proper subset of {φ∈X : δ(φ)=1}, since {φ∈X : δ(φ)=1} itself is not logically 
consistent. Choose any ψ∈{φ∈X : δ(φ)=1}\Ψ2. Since Ψ2 is a maximal logically consistent 
subset of {φ∈X : δ(φ)=1}, Ψ2∪{ψ} is not logically consistent (otherwise Ψ2 would not be 
maximal), and hence Ψ2 entails ¬ψ. Let Ψ1 = {ψ}; Ψ1 is logically consistent, since, by 
assumption, ψ is not a contradiction. Then Ψ1 and Ψ2 have the properties required by (ii). 
(ii) implies (i): Suppose that (ii) holds. Since Ψ1 entails φ and Ψ2 entails ¬φ, Ψ1∪Ψ2 is 
logically inconsistent. But {φ∈X : δ(φ)=1}⊇Ψ1∪Ψ2. Therefore {φ∈X : δ(φ)=1} is also 
logically inconsistent. ■ 
 
Lemma A2. Suppose that the agent uses a modus ponens decision process. Then, for any 
φ∈X, (i) there exists a decision path Ω  such that φ is accepted in a modus ponens decision 
process for Ω (i.e. φ∈M(δ, Ω)) if and only if (ii) there exists a logically consistent subset 
Ψ⊆X such that [δ(ψ)=1 for all ψ∈Ψ] and Ψ entails φ. 
 
Proof of lemma A2. Let φ be any proposition in X. 
(i) implies (ii): Suppose that (i) holds. Let Ω be a decision path such that φ∈M(δ, Ω). Choose 
t such that φ is accepted in step t in the decision process under path Ω. Let  
Ψ = {ψ∈X : δ(ψ)=1 and ψ is accepted at some step m<t under Ω}.  
The fact that φ is accepted in step t implies that either δ(φ)=1 or Ψ entails φ. If δ(φ)=1, then 
Ψ={φ} has the properties required by (ii); Ψ is logically consistent, as, by assumption, φ is 
not a contradiction. If Ψ entails φ, then Ψ has the properties required by (ii); Ψ is logically 
consistent, as Ψ⊆M(δ, Ω), which is logically consistent. 
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(ii) implies (i): Suppose that (ii) holds. Construct Ω as follows. Let t = |Ψ∪{φ}|. On {1, 2, 
…, t}, let Ω
 
be any bijective mapping from {1, 2, …, t} onto Ψ∪{φ} such that Ω(t) = φ. To 
make Ω exhaustive, we extend the definition of Ω as follows. On {t+1, ..., k} (where k = |X|), 
let Ω
 
be any bijective mapping from {t+1, ..., k} onto X\(Ψ∪{φ}). Then Ω has the properties 
required by (i). ■ 
 
Proof of theorem 1. Let φ be any proposition in X. Let (i) and (ii) denote the left and right 
sides of the biconditional, respectively.  
(i) implies (ii): Suppose that (i) holds. Since there exists a decision path Ω1 such that φ∈M(δ, 
Ω1), lemma A2 implies that there exists a logically consistent subset Ψ1⊆X such that [δ(ψ)=1 
for all ψ∈Ψ1] and Ψ1 entails φ. Similarly, since there exists a decision path Ω2 such that 
¬φ∈M(δ, Ω2), lemma A2 implies that there exists a logically consistent subset Ψ2⊆X such 
that [δ(ψ)=1 for all ψ∈Ψ2] and Ψ2 entails ¬φ. Therefore the agent’s initial dispositions are 
implicitly inconsistent with respect to φ. 
(ii) implies (i): Suppose that (ii) holds. Then there exist two logically consistent subsets 
Ψ1,Ψ2⊆X such that [δ(ψ)=1 for all ψ∈Ψ1∪Ψ2] and Ψ1 entails φ and Ψ2 entails ¬φ. By lemma 
A2, sinceΨ1 is a logically consistent subset of X such that [δ(ψ)=1 for all ψ∈Ψ1] and 
Ψ1 entails φ, there exists a decision path Ω1 such that φ∈M(δ, Ω1). Similarly, by lemma A2, 
since Ψ2 is a logically consistent subset of X such that [δ(ψ)=1 for all ψ∈Ψ2] and Ψ2 entails 
¬φ, there exists a decision path Ω2 such that ¬φ∈M(δ, Ω2). ■ 
 
Proof of lemma 1. Suppose that δ is complete and weakly consistent. Let φ be any 
proposition in X. Let (i) and (ii) denote the left and right sides of the biconditional, 
respectively.  
(i) implies (ii): Suppose that (i) holds. Then there exist two logically consistent subsets 
Ψ1,Ψ2⊆X such that [δ(ψ)=1 for all ψ∈Ψ1∪Ψ2] and Ψ1 entails φ and Ψ2 entails ¬φ. Since δ is 
weakly consistent, δ(φ) = 0 or δ(¬φ) = 0. If δ(φ) = 0, then δ violates deductive closure with 
respect to φ, since [δ(ψ)=1 for all ψ∈Ψ1],Ψ1 entails φ and δ(φ) = 0. If δ(¬φ) = 0, then δ 
violates deductive closure with respect to ¬φ, since [δ(ψ)=1 for all ψ∈Ψ2],Ψ2 entails ¬φ and 
δ(¬φ) = 0.  
(ii) implies (i): Suppose that (ii) holds. Case 1: δ violates deductive closure with respect to φ. 
Then there exists a logically consistent set Ψ1⊆X such that [δ(ψ)=1 for all ψ∈Ψ1],Ψ1 entails 
φ and δ(φ) = 0. Since δ is complete, δ(¬φ) = 1. LetΨ2 = {¬φ}, which is logically consistent 
since ¬φ is not a contradiction. Case 2: δ violates deductive closure with respect to ¬φ. Then 
there exists a logically consistent set Ψ2⊆X such that [δ(ψ)=1 for all ψ∈Ψ2],Ψ2 entails 
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¬φ and δ(¬φ) = 0. Since δ is complete, δ(φ) = 1. Let Ψ1 = {φ}, which is logically consistent 
since φ is not a contradiction. In both cases, the existence of Ψ1 and Ψ2 establishes that δ is 
implicitly inconsistent with respect to φ. ■ 
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